

The Gatekeepers: An Investigation into the Pre-Qualification & Qualification Stages of Direct Democracy in California, 1912-1998

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

This project analyzes changes with the drafting and qualification stages of direct democracy in California. For some time now, scholars of direct democracy have noted the dearth of studies assessing the emergence of initiative issues, the assignment of Title and Summary and the qualification of measures for the ballot (Magleby 1984; Lee 1989; Smith 1999). In this study, a database of measures that are proposed and qualified is constructed. Building on the work of Magleby (1984), the paper updates findings about the institutional and structural hurdles necessary for initiative proposals to move from the formulation of ballot language to appearance on the ballot. The work goes further offering a research strategy to understand how the “initiative industry” plays a critical role in the initiative process.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A database of proposed, qualified and initiatives passed by voters is constructed through information obtained from the Political Reform Division of the California Secretary of State’s office (SoS-PRD) emphasizing the period from 1980 through 1998. Archival records from ballot measure committees are scrutinized. In Part III, a theoretical model is proposed to address the interaction between ballot activity and the “initiative industry.” .

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Part I: Changes in the Growth of Direct Democracy in California

1.1 Introduction

This paper explores changes in the submission and qualification of ballot measures updating the work of Magleby (1984). In Chapter 4 of his work, *Direct Legislation*, Magleby argues that the resurgence of initiative activity among American states in the 1970s and early 1980s was fueled by the rise of the “initiative industry.” This industry could affect those issues coming to the ballot. Magleby warns of the danger where what comes to the ballot principally reflects, “issues placed before the voters reflect [ing] the interests of groups with money or highly motivated volunteers” (1984: 76). Magleby links the rise of the “initiative industry” with changes in the overall level of ballot activity. Understanding how these changes evolved allows scholars some perspective about overall changes in California's initiative experience. This exercise also serves to lay a foundation for how the initiative process became the principal policy vehicle to enact changes in the state's politics. I set out in this essay to describe the general characteristics of California's initiative experience since adoption of the tools of the Progressives in October 1911. Towards this goal, I address how the institution of direct democracy changed during the first two stages of the process from the drafting of prospective measures and onto the qualification stage. Part II of the paper emphasizes changes in the level of initiative activity through the 3 stages of the process. Included in this section is a brief discussion of growth in campaign expenditures on initiatives. One corollary effect of the increase in ballot measure activity is how the emphasis in direct democracy moved to the front-end of the process, that is, to the stages of drafting and qualifying for the ballot. In Part III, I add to present research by proposing a theoretical model to investigate the Magleby (1984) thesis concerning the general rise of political professionals and firms that specifically occur in the early stages of ballot measure campaigns.

Over the past 87 years, the initiative process in California has undergone

monumental change. A dramatic increase in the number of measures submitted for Title and Summary (Stage 1), the number of measures where signatures actually are gathered (Stage 2), and those that qualify for the ballot (Stage 3), altered the nature of direct democracy in the state. The rise of ballot measure activity resulted in the direct democracy arena becoming the principal political battleground in the state.

1.12 Research Approach & Operationalization

Resources exist for documenting the extensive rise of ballot measure activity in California. And while data sources are available from the California Secretary of State (CA-SoS), assimilation and distribution of the data remains largely untapped. In order to construct a complete database of California initiatives that were proposed, qualified for the ballot, and were either passed or rejected by votes, I consulted the California Secretary of State's publication, *History of the California Initiative Process* (Jones: 1998, 1999). In addition, I consulted previous editions of the *History* (Eu: 1989) as well as records available from the California State Archives for initiatives from 1980 through 1998. This timeframe was selected because of the reliability of the archival records collection and in order to update the Magleby (1984) work. The database was checked against other scholarly records to assure it was complete with regard to popular initiatives (Allswang 1991; California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992; Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984; Schmidt 1989). The universe includes all popularly proposed ballot measures submitted for Title and Summary, including those measures where signatures were collected, and those that ultimately qualified for the ballot.¹ Legislative-sponsored initiatives and referenda are not included in the analysis.

1.13 Growth in the Importance Direct Democracy as an Institution

While scholarly attention to direct democracy, "has waxed and waned since South Dakota adopted the initiative and referendum nearly century ago" (Smith 1999:446), recent interest in the topic increased as the initiative process grew more important as a policy-making institution. Nationally, 27 states possess the tools of direct democracy in

¹ Data for this section is from Jones 1998, 1999, *A History of the Initiative Process* (Sacramento, California Secretary of State). For the 1998 Primary and General election periods, the author calculated data from information provided by the California Secretary of State, Political Reform Division. 2

one form or another.² Growth of overall ballot activity in these states is dramatic. In the 1960s, 85 ballot measures appeared on state ballots. By the 1970s, this number grew to 120 rising to 193 initiatives in the 1980s (see Magleby in Butler and Ranney (eds.) 1994). In the 1996 election period alone, a high water mark was reached as 101 citizen initiatives broke the previous record of 89 measures set in 1914 (UVA report, 1996: 1). This past election period of 1998 witnessed a drop off as there were only 61 initiatives across the nation during the general election period (Waters 1998a: 5).

It is California's initiative experience, however, that illustrates tremendous growth both in the frequency and scope of direct democracy. In the period from 1966 to 1998 alone, the number of items that appeared on the ballot almost doubled from that of the *previous fifty years*. Critics seized on this growth alleging that amateur citizen movements have less and less to do with the initiative process. The explosion of ballot measure activity was accompanied by the growth of professional campaigning in some form. This professionalization of direct democracy is witness to initiative proponents spending large sums of dollars to draft, qualify and campaign for measures. Once measures are assigned a ballot title, language in the initiative may not be amended. Thus, the early dollars at the front-end of the process prove critical. Initiative opponents enter into the game later, but also expend large sums of dollars to defeat measures.

In contrast to what the advocates of direct democracy expected, critics allege these professionalized measures now dominate the formulation, qualification, and campaign process in direct democracy. What was viewed as a grassroots process conducted by ordinary citizens now is increasingly seen as a playground for organized special interests and campaign professionals.

As more and more measures are submitted, qualified and passed, questions arise about the integrity of direct democracy as a process used "by the people" to get measures on the ballot. The data from Magleby (1984) and this paper illustrate how the push for Title and Summary (Stage 1), followed by petition collection (Stage 2), and the campaign of an initiative (Stage 3), moved from the Progressive ideal of a safety valve for the people to, "an emerging culture of democracy by initiative transforming the electorate into a fourth and new branch of government" (California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992:2).

² The citizens of twenty-four states possess the ability to draft and vote on direct legislation (The states include CA as well as AL, AZ, AK, CO, ID, ME, MA, MI, MO, MT, NE, NV, ND, OH, OK, OR, SD, UT, WA & WY). In three states (KY, MD, & NM), as well as those states listed previously, voters can require the Legislature to refer items to the electorate via the ballot as a referendum only. Two states (FL & IL) allow voters only to refer only state constitutional amendments. Fifteen other states (CA as well as AZ, AK, CO, MA, MI, MO, MT, NE, NV, OH, OK, OR, SD & WA) allow statutory measures. The District of Columbia has provisions for both voter initiatives and popular

Critics point to this condition as evidence that direct democracy is no longer a "grassroots" process but it is now thoroughly professional frequently cite this "emerging culture of democracy". Furthermore, these critics contend that as the process becomes more popular, only deep-pocketed special interest groups can afford to jump over the hurdles through each stage (Magleby 1984, Smith 1999).

Students of initiative politics mimic these concerns, pointing to the growth of ballot measure activity and the steep rise in campaign spending as an interaction between spending, resources and interest group status. Past research often focuses on the level of spending by special interests and the effects of spending on opinion formation and voter responsiveness to campaign stimuli. For example, some researchers link campaign expenditures with success at the ballot box (see Lowenstein 1982; Magleby 1984; Owens & Wade 1984). These studies analyze patterns of campaign spending and distinguish between what types of groups spend amounts of campaign dollars (Magleby 1984; Cronin 1987; Gerber 1998a), the success of initiative proponent and opponent spending (Lowenstein 1982; Zisk 1984) and the strategies of interest groups involved with initiatives (Gerber 1994; Lascher 1995).

However, all of these studies draw from a simple observation - an increase in ballot activity and a potential link with changes in the process, i.e., what propositions actually appear on the ballot. This link, however as several researchers point out, is tenuous at best and suffers from a lack of controls for changes in population, frequency of appearance on the ballot, the type of election (on-year versus off-year, primary versus general election ballot) and other similar checks. Furthermore, the initiative strategies of groups are confounding factors as well for as groups reach for the ballot more often, strategies can become multi-faceted. Often groups both support and oppose measures and participate in coalitions reflecting this strategy. One way to deal with these concerns is to think of initiatives as a process through several *stages* each with different requirements for spending, contacting voters and conducting a campaign. By taking a step back examining how the initiative process evolved through these stages, a fuller picture of California's direct democracy experience emerges. This step back also allows us to more closely examine the trends pointed out by Magleby (1984). With the growth of direct democracy as an institution and the possible ramifications of this growth for democratic governance in mind, I turn to analysis of California's popular elections since 1980.

Part II: The Forest From the Trees with Regard to Ballot Measure Activity

1.2 Direct Democracy: Macro Changes in Ballot Activity, 1912 - 1998

California voters adopted direct democracy by a margin of more than 3 to 1 in favor of the measure in a special election held October 10, 1911.³ The vote secured California as the tenth state to adopt the initiative, recall and referendum.⁴ And in the wake of passage, the arena of direct democracy quickly became an active field of political battle.

The general rise of initiative activity over the last eighty-nine years is dramatic. Figure 1.1 presents the growth of ballot measures submitted, qualified and appearing before voters during this time. Each stage of the process is represented as a bar for each decade. For example, in the period immediately after the state adopted the initiative, recall and referendum from 1915 to 1919, forty-six measures were submitted for Title and Summary, thirty-one measures qualified and seven ultimately passed.

California's first two decades of direct democracy experience were noteworthy for the high percentage of proposed measures actually qualifying for the ballot. As we can see in Figure 1.1, of the ninety-seven initiatives that were proposed during the period from 1912 - 1930, sixty-five qualified for the ballot (67%). Of those that qualified, twenty-eight percent (N = 18 of 65 measures qualified) actually passed. Clearly in California's early initiative years, two-thirds of all measures that were proposed actually qualified for the ballot. While the overall number of proposed initiatives is low given California's recent experience, the success of movement from Stage 1 to Stage 2 in this early era of professionalization is nonetheless striking. And while the period witnessed some degree of professional political activity, the marketplace of initiatives was clearly controlled to a large extent by a relatively small cadre of professionals (Kelley 1956; McCuan, et al 1998; Price 1991; Rasky 1999).

While proponents experienced success early on qualifying for the ballot, California's initiative explosion is most evident over the last thirty years or so. Figure 1.1 illustrates that growth where three times as many measures were submitted for qualification to the ballot *after* 1966 as compared with the period from 1912 to 1965.

³ The official voter establishing the initiative process in California was 168,744 in favor (76.4%) and 52,093 against (23.6%). See Jones (1998) for further information on the results of this election.

⁴ South Dakota was the first state to enact the initiative and referendum in 1898. By 1910, California joined Utah, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Missouri, Michigan, Arkansas and Colorado in adopting direct democracy (Jones 1998).

Furthermore, in the past thirty years, California voters approved slightly more ballot measures than in the previous five decades combined. In their comprehensive two-year study of California's initiative process, the California Commission on Campaign Financing points out that, "the number of initiatives circulated, qualified and adopted in this state has now reached record proportions - jumping fivefold since the 1960s" (1992:1).

In general, scholars of initiatives noted growth in ballot activity was accompanied by growth in campaign spending. The assumption in many cases was that campaign costs were driven by more and more expensive measures appearing before voters. But the three stages of direct democracy distribute costs *differently* and for *distinct* services in each stage. Therefore, analysis of only those measures that make it to the ballot neglects the important dollars spent early in the process to draft, title, and circulate initiatives. [See Figure 1.1 Below]

As we move from right to left in Figure 1.1, a sharp acceleration is noticeable for ballot activity in the 1970s. During this decade, one hundred eighty measures were submitted for Title and Summary, followed by two hundred sixty one submitted in the 1980s, and three hundred thirty two measures submitted in the 1990s. In the six decades prior to 1970, only two hundred seventy measures were submitted for Title and Summary. The period from 1915 through 1949 remained relatively steady in terms of the number of measures submitted, qualified and passed by voters. However, in the 1950s, initiative activity declined substantially from past eras when only one measure passed during the decade.⁵ The 1960s, a period of policy resurgence in many areas and across multiple institutions, witnessed a burst of activity onto the initiative scene. In this decade, an increase in activity was noticeable between 1965 and 1969 when twenty-nine measures were submitted for Title and Summary. Despite a rise in the number of submitted measures, only three popularly proposed initiatives passed during this decade with all three passing in the 1963 and 1964 elections.

1.21 Understanding Institutional Shifts of Increased Initiative Activity

The general activism of the 1960s also produced a broad shift in the initiative arena. This shift reflects the growing policy activism of groups (Lowi 1964; Wilson 1973)

⁵ There is some discrepancy here between the data provided by the CA SoS and the actual ballots. In 1952, Proposition 1 appeared on the June 1952 ballot to change the rules for voting in primaries. The measure was a popularly proposed initiative sponsored by the California political parties. The measure passed. However, the CA SoS data only includes Proposition XX from the November 1956 ballot as the sole popular initiative measure that passed during this decade. This fact was ⁶ brought to the attention of the CA SoS and as of the Summer of 1999 had not been changed.

and changes in California's governing institutions. First, the initiative process itself was altered when California voters authorized the appearance of ballot initiatives for primary, general and special election ballots in 1960. In 1966, the institution was further altered when the indirect initiative was eliminated. The indirect initiative was designed to allow the Legislature an opportunity to enact or reject a proposed law. If the Legislature rejected the measure or amended it, the Secretary of State submitted the proposal to the ballot at the next general election (Jones 1998:3). Signature requirements for statutory measures were reduced in 1966 from eight percent to five percent (Magleby 1984: 68).

Further institutional shifts occurred. Passage of the legislative-sponsored measure Proposition 1A in 1966 creating a full-time, permanent legislature signaled a sea change in the state's politics. After 1966, the rise of competing institutions (the Legislature and the Governor's office) and attempts by groups to lobby these institutions became more entrenched.

From 1912 to 1965, two hundred forty four initiatives were submitted for assignment of Title and Summary to the Attorney General's office. Of these, one hundred forty one (58%) qualified for the ballot. Voters approved thirty-nine of the one hundred forty one measures (28%). In the succeeding period from 1966 to 1998, seven hundred twelve measures were submitted to the Attorney General's office with one hundred twenty one (17%) initiatives qualifying for the ballot. Of those that qualified during this period, forty-six (38%) passed. *Again, since 1966, three times as many measures were submitted for qualification to the ballot. Furthermore, in the past thirty years, California voters have approved slightly more ballot measures than in the previous five decades combined.*

If we consider the rate of passage for all measures from 1912 to 1965, 28% of all measures that qualified for the ballot actually passed. If the anomaly of the 1950s is eliminated from the analysis because initiative activity virtually disappeared in the state, voters passed 30% of qualified initiatives. These numbers are consistent with the patterns described by scholars noted above. That is, as Magleby (1984, 1994) relates above, most scholars make the observation that about 1 in every 3 measures passes the ballot (see also Cronin 1987). While not a hard rule this "1 in 3" provision does provide us with some baseline that we can use to assess the success and failure of ballot measures. The general trend of "1 in 3" initiatives passing appears overall to hold for California measures from 1912 to 1996. [See Table 1.1 Below]

If we think of the initiative process as a three-step process from assignment of Title and Summary by the Attorney General's office, to qualification for the ballot, to actual passage by the voters, a different story emerges about success rates.

Table 1.1 illustrates California's initiative experience through the three stages of the process. As pointed out above, the rate for measures submitted for Title and Summary and subsequently qualifying for the ballot between 1912 and 1965 was 58%. From 1966 to 1998, the average for measures moving from submission to qualification was substantially lower at 17%.

In addition to the changes with the qualification rates of initiatives, corresponding rates of passage also ebbed and flowed. Table 1.1 illustrates the extent to which passage, the ultimate measure of success for any initiative, changed over time. What is most surprising is the percentage change in measures that have moved from Title and Summary to Qualification for the ballot. In the early years, notable for the lack of a competitive, high profile professional initiative industry (or at least an industry only in its infancy), the rate of qualification was substantially higher than for later decades when reliance on professional help became more commonplace. *The average rate for qualification during the first four decades of direct democracy was 60%. In the decades of increased professionalization, beginning roughly in the 1960s to the present, the mean for qualification of measures submitted to the Attorney General's office was 18%. This statistic is surprising and counterintuitive as we would expect professionals to increase the rate of qualification of initiative proposals all other things being equal.* However, the state also witnessed an explosion of measures submitted for consideration over the past thirty years. On its face, therefore, this disparity needs to be handled with care in considering the impact of political professionals. I will return this point later in the essay.

Table 1.1 highlights a distinct pattern emerging for the post-1960s era. From 1966 to 1998, voters passed 38% of all initiatives that qualified for the ballot noticeably higher than the pattern evident from 1912 through 1965. Therefore, the earlier years witnessed a higher mean rate of passage. One could argue that the initiative industry during this period, while active, was not of the same level for sophisticated electioneering tools. Moreover, these differing rates of passage are prima facie evidence of an evolution that has taken place over the last thirty years.

1.3 Focusing on Changes in the Growth & Subject Matter of Initiatives, 1912 - 1998

In this section, I examine four distinct eras of California's direct democracy highlighting the three stages of the process. The goal is to analyze more precisely how the practice of direct democracy changed since 1912 and set the stage for how changes with ballot measure tactics affected the institution of direct democracy and vice-versa.

1.31 The Macro View: General Subject Matter of Initiatives, 1912 – 1996

Before moving to specific eras of California's initiative subject matter, an overall perspective is in order for propositions appearing on the ballot between 1912 and 1996.⁶ Of the 19 broad subjects used by the California Secretary of State to categorize initiative subject matter, several traditional policy areas are prominent. First, measures related to Taxation (N =114 proposed) and Government Regulation (N = 105) are frequently proposed. And while Taxation measures (38% qualification rate) qualify for the ballot at the third highest rate behind Bond Issues (50% qualification rate) and Environmental Issues (40% qualification rate), the passage rate for Taxation initiatives through the three stages is actually quite low at only about 9% of those proposed measures ultimately receiving passage from voters. Tax issues fare about as well as Education (8.33% passage rate) and Labor measures (8% passage rate). Measures that seem to fare best overall from Stage 1 through Stage 3 and are ultimately passed, include Campaign Reform initiatives (21% passage rate) and Bond measures (18% passage rate).

The frequency of policy issues that appear on the ballot in California is a subject of some contention. According to the Secretary of State (1996), political reform measures are the most frequent subject of initiatives. Closely behind in frequency are tax and fiscal measures. Recent literature on direct democracy has repeated these findings. A 1992 report that analyzed the initiative process, claimed that "Throughout the history of ballot initiatives in California, the topics of reform have shifted in accordance with the needs of the times" (California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992:58). While morality issues represented many of the early initiatives, taken as a whole, the topic of governmental and political reform has been the emphasis of most ballot measures. With only one environmental initiative appearing on the ballot prior to 1960, the period after 1960 is a testament to the growing visibility of environmental measures throughout the

⁶ The figures for data from 1998 are not included at this juncture. In subsequent revisions, the figures will certainly be updated. 9

country. A return to governmental reform measures was evident in the 1970s and 1980s as there was renewed interest in “government inefficiency and unresponsiveness” as central themes of initiatives.⁷ In the following sections, I lay out the range of ballot measure activity in distinct periods including analysis of the subject matter of propositions. In this way, we begin to peel back the veneer of the myth of amateurism cited by Magleby and others. We can also increase our understanding of the level of interests involved with California's initiative process from the very beginning as largely organized around entrenched legislative interests.

1.32 The Micro View: The Early Years & Subject Matter, 1912 – 1929

Subject matter in the first decades of California's initiative experience is presented in Figure 1.2. Four policy areas - Taxation (N = 14), Government Regulation (N = 13), Health (N = 11), and Elections (N = 10) - comprise almost 50% of the proposed ballot measures during this time. However, while ten of the fourteen Taxation measures qualified for the ballot (71%), not a single popularly proposed initiative dealing with taxes passed during this time. A dismal showing also was evident for measures dealing with Government Regulation where only two of the eight measures (15%) that qualified were passed and with Health measures where eight initiatives qualified and only 2 passed (18% overall passage rate). In the Elections area, three of the eight measures that qualified were passed by voters (30% overall passage rate). What became clear early on to proponents and opponents alike was that while you may propose and even qualify a popular initiative, passage of the measure was by no means an easy task. Two-thirds of all proposed measures qualified for the ballot between 1912 and 1929. However, less than twenty percent (N = 18/97 or 18.6%) of all proposed measures ultimately succeeded on Election Day. The general threshold of “1 in 3” initiatives that qualify and are ultimately passed by voters proposed by Magleby (1984, 1994) and others was not yet met. [See Figure 1.2 Below]

1.33 The Micro View: Subject Matter of California Initiatives, 1930 - 1959

By the 1930s, California initiatives were clearly becoming higher stakes battles between competing interest groups. During this period, contests pitting issues of public morality, taxation and environmental measures were the most frequent subjects of ballot

⁷ See 1992. California Commission on Campaign Financing. 58-61. Also see Allswang 1991. 10

measures. Prior to the formation of the first professional campaign management firm, Whitaker & Baxter's Campaigns, Inc. in 1933, the initiatives in the previous period consisted primarily of "morals" propositions (Allswang 1991:12-14). The morality initiatives, "dealt with prohibition or control of liquor...and efforts to control boxing, wrestling, horseracing and various religious practices (*ibid.* : 12). The birth of Campaigns, Inc. established professional campaign consulting for candidates, statewide initiatives, and referenda as well as issue advocacy campaigns. The firm was involved in more than 75 races between 1930 and 1958.⁸ Figure 1.2 also presents the subject matter of initiatives between 1930 and 1959 where the mean passage rate for initiatives from the proposal stage to passage during the period was 14% (N = 18 / 126). [See Figure 1.2 Below]

In this period, relatively few initiatives were submitted and qualified for the ballot. In the period from 1950 to 1960 alone, only one popular initiative passed (in 1952). This decade was noteworthy from a consulting standpoint as campaign strategies moved from the incorporation of radio, newspaper and billboard advertisements to early experiments with television and directed voter targeting in cooperation with survey research. By the 1950s, Whitaker and Baxter were not alone in California and perhaps "dozens" of firms were operating in the state at this time involved with campaign management and public affairs consulting.⁹ The first professional signature-gathering firm, Robinson and Associates (also known as Robinson & Company), is established in Los Angeles in 1940 (Berg & Holman 1987). While Robinson and Associates was known to be operating in the state for sometime before this, the firm itself was officially established just prior to World War II.¹⁰

The subject matter of ballot measures in the period was principally concentrated in three policy areas - Taxation & Fiscal Matters (N = 29 measures proposed); Health & Alcohol Issues (such as Prohibition era measures, N = 29 measures proposed); and Environmental Issues (N = 11) comprise 55% (69 /126) of the proposed ballot measures during this time. While seven of the eleven Environmental measures qualified for the ballot (64%), only one passed in the 1930s. 'Law and Order' measures constituted but one - half of one percent of all measures appearing on the ballot between 1930 and 1959,

⁸ Data for the campaigns of Whitaker & Baxter were gathered from the collections housed at the State Archives and the Bancroft Library, University of California. After the 1933 Central Valley Project referendum, the firm typically handled 5 to 6 initiative measures per election cycle (see McWilliams 1951: 348; and Kelley 1956, especially Chapter 2).

⁹ See *California Commission on Campaign Financing* 1992: 199. Also see Kelley 1956; Rapaport 1991.

but four of the six measures qualified and ultimately passed. In the case of subject matter, 'Law and Order' measures had the highest rate of passage through the three stages of the process.

1.34 The Micro View: 1960 - 1979 Subject Matter Comes of Age

Absolute growth in the presence of campaign professionals accelerated during this period as the number of measures submitted to the Attorney General doubled over that of the previous era. The prominent rise of an "initiative industry" can be traced to a certain degree to the period immediately following the passage of two ballot measures. Proposition 1A, passed by California voters in 1966, led to the advent of a full-time, professional Legislature. The infrastructure created by Proposition 1A enhanced staff, increased facilities and the tools available to the institution. As a result, the new body began to contribute in meaningful ways with other actors to create policies. The new institution became more partisan as legislators quickly realized the political requirements of reapportionment, elections and constituency service. A corresponding staff of political professionals sprang up around the leadership and majority party service operations. Each caucus established its own party services office, complete with incumbent protection assistance, member & staff training, and election operations. Year-round political operatives became necessary to deal with special elections, a Supreme Court-required reapportionment and to serve as an important link to party-based support.

Passage of Proposition 9 in 1974 also ushered in a new political landscape. The initiative was designed to clean-up elections by requiring detailed disclosure of contributions and expenditures to campaigns supporting and opposing state, local and ballot measures as well as requiring disclosure of lobbying expenditures for the legislative and executive branches. The measure also required legislative staffers who worked on campaigns to take official leaves of absence from their state positions. The practice of "going off payroll" hastened development and specialization of consultant operations outside the Legislature.¹¹ Figure 1.2 also provides the subject matter of initiatives between 1960 & 1979. [See Figure 1.2 Below]

¹¹ An additional development was critical during this period. From 1912 to 1966, the indirect initiative was a fixture of the California initiative process. In November of 1966, voters eliminated this practice which was designed as a method for voters to propose legislation to the Legislature. If a qualified petition was signed by enough voters (in this case, 5% of all votes cast for Governor in the last general election), the Secretary of State submitted the measure to the Legislature which had 40 days to act on the measure with amendments or changes. In the case of rejection, the measure would be presented to voters in the next general election (see Jones 1996). 12

1.35 The Micro View: 1980 - 1996 Direct Democracy as a Critical Policy Arena & The Rise of Political Professionals

In the period immediately after Proposition 9 passed, concurrent trends were also affecting California politics. The growth of campaign technology and the reliance on specialists who provide expert advice within the constraints of a campaign were two noteworthy developments. Advising candidates, parties and PACs became “a new growth industry in America” (Luntz 1988: 43). Modern campaigns reflected new players, the consultants themselves, who replaced or worked closely with parties. The incentive to raise large sums of campaign donations for spending on specialized campaign technologies also has become an important concern. The hunt for campaign cash to fulfill expanding resource opportunities reflects a change in campaign tactics towards a more selective, narrowly cast electorate. This view of political professionals treats their growth not as a new trend, but one that has widened to include a larger, more specialized and highly technical consulting universe.

Party leaders, interest groups, corporations or political consultants used these new marketing techniques to a larger extent than ever before. But the growth and existence of an enduring professional political industry also provides a potential campaign organization for any episodic initiative committee who wishes to fight in an election, whether they are part of the normal political structure or not.

Development of the political marketing industry was, of course, tied to development of the commercial marketing sector, and the adoption of political marketing techniques closely paralleled the development of mass marketing in the commercial sector (Bowler, et al. 1996). Early on, many individuals found short-term paid employment conducting such campaigns as the following comment attests:

There were managers, party hacks and volunteers to stuff envelopes, raise money, and write copy. But always, [post-election day] the posters came down, the headquarters were swept out and campaign workers packed off to whatever fate awaited them ‘off-year.’

(Rapaport 1991:418-419)

Figure 1.2 highlights the convergence of traditional ballot measure issues such as taxes and political reform with newer issues related to healthcare and the environment in the period from 1980 to 1996. In the period immediately after Proposition 13 was passed

by California voters, Taxation & Fiscal Issues were the most frequent measures proposed for the ballot (N = 122 / 506 measures or 24%) followed by 'Law and Order' measures (N = 62 / 506 or 12%). Health Issues were about 6% of those measures proposed (N = 31 / 506), while Environmental measures were slightly more frequent at 8.5% (N = 43 / 506). Of the measures qualifying for the ballot, again, Tax & Fiscal Issues were prominently featured and were frequently passed by California voters. In this area, 28% of all measures that passed (N = 11 / 40) dealt with taxes or fiscal issues. While the figures presented throughout this section provide some background supplied by Magleby and others about the general trends of initiative activity in California, the bare numbers mask the true role of the "initiative industry" in steering business through the stages of direct democracy. In the section following, I present a theoretical argument for how the "industry" has grown and the central role it plays in ballot success. In this paper, I do not provide data for the research, but lay out a testable hypothesis for the probable effects of this "initiative industry."

Part III: The Rise of Political Professionals in the Initiative Process

1.4 A Model for Investigating the Rise of Political Professionals in Direct Democracy: Theoretical Overview

In 1981, Larry Sabato presented results on the growth of political consulting in the work, *The Rise of Political Consultants*. Sabato argued that the dramatic rise of campaign spending was characterized best as the work of a set of elite political operatives. These operatives or consultants had at their disposal the foremost tools of modern election campaigns - that is, media spot production, direct mail and a general expertise in the processes of electioneering. Therefore, since at least the 1960s, Sabato argued political campaigns were the domain of these operatives who flowed between candidates and campaigns as free agents often following the highest bidder (or biggest spender) to retain their services. The lack of party cohesion and the reforms of the party nominating apparatus enhanced the power of these consultants even further. By joining schools of thought on attempts to reform parties together with a general rise in modern campaign communication techniques, Sabato maintained that political consultants filled the void for candidates in elections. As candidates moved independently of the party structure and financed their own way, consultants moved to engage participants in the candidate-

centered campaign.

Sabato's work was largely well received and together with the work of scholars a generation earlier and hence, his work remains a seminal piece on the role of consultants in elections. The work, though, suffers from generalizability problems and application to elections other than those for candidates. It was not Sabato's intention to blanket all types of political campaigns, but scholars generally looked to his work and those of others as examples of the vast changes in the campaign environment. For instance, Nimmo (1970) points out the breadth of the consulting influence on the communications side of campaigns beginning in the 1960s but having its roots much earlier in the field of public relations (see Kelley 1956). Herrnson (1994; 1996) details the dramatic rise of the consulting influence outside of parties or tied to it only in a piecemeal way. His work on the role of campaign professionals in Congressional campaigns highlights differences between incumbent and challenger use of these professionals. In most cases, well-funded incumbents use consultants to a greater degree and with greater variation of campaign tasks than do their financially challenged opponents.

The model of candidates who are independent of party and campaign through an individual candidate-centered campaign is hardly a new development. A cursory glance at political campaigning through the decades, if not longer, reflects the independent streak of candidates away from party based influences. This is not to say that party has not always played a role or had some element of persuasion in candidates' lives. However, partisan strings are now widely acknowledged to play only a cursory role in the campaign lives of candidates. Moreover, consultants to some critics (Petracca 1988; 1989) rush into the party void and fully negate any substantial role for the party. And in some cases, consultants moved from campaigning roles to governing roles thereby altering forever the links between the two (Tenpas 1998; Thurber 1998).

The scholarly literature on the nature of political consulting, however, suffers from an important breakdown in placing the proverbial cart before the horse. First, the use of consultants is not a new phenomenon. As the work of some scholars noted (Bowler, et al. 1996; Kelley 1956; Rasky 1998; Thurber 1998), American elections have a rich tradition of expert, outside assistance. "Experts" assisting the campaign are retained to provide campaign expertise in areas deemed critical for success. Second, there are important hidden reasons for retaining professionals. In many cases, this expert help is employed so the competing camp doesn't scoop up the best "experts" available. Therefore, candidates work to enhance the value of their campaign organizations to the fullest extent

possible (Herrnson 1992; 1994).

Three elements of the consulting literature are clear at this point: 1). Campaign consulting has a long lineage; 2). The campaign environment itself changed – it became more technologically sophisticated; and 3) Candidates' perception of the race colors their view of the role campaign “experts” play. This perception has direct value for the use of political professionals. But what of elections where candidates are absent? Who replaces campaign professionals, for example, in ballot measure campaigns? Recall that direct democracy is intended as a vehicle around entrenched political interests, yet the campaigns themselves are much more prominent in California today. How do interest groups, important players in financing candidate-centered campaigns, perceive the role of campaign professionals in elections where partisan cues are less obvious and the rules of the campaign game are less well known, as is the case with direct democracy? Are these questions even worth examination in light of the critique Sabato and others pronounce in the wake of the rise of political consulting?

1.41 Theoretical Component #1: Changes With Campaign Processes - Applying the Candidate Campaign Literature to the Initiative Environment

The scholarly literature that the rise of consulting was a force in election campaigns is based on the use of modern communication tools to reach a mobile, independent electorate. However, my argument rests not only with a rise in the quantity of consultants using new tools, but also a rise in the overall quality of these individuals. Candidate campaigns began to use more consultants with a growing level of expertise and specializations (Sabato 1981; Medvic 1998). Moreover, incumbents use consultants with greater frequency and with distinct specialties at a higher rate than challengers (Herrnson 1996; Medvic 1998).

The elections literature captures the significant advances in campaign techniques prominent during the decline of partisan identification. Sabato (1981) noted the pervasiveness of campaign technology and the “rise of political consultants” emerging into a wholly distinguishable industry by the late 1970s. The budding industry, that of a political professional marketplace, moved from a biennial industry of public relations firms and market researchers (or “generalists” in the view of some scholars),¹² to enduring businesses of both general consultants and specialists including direct mail consultants,

¹² See for example, Kelley (1956); Sabato (1981); Rosenbloom (1983); and Salmore & Salmore (1989). 16

pollsters, lawyers, and signature-gatherers.

The rise of advanced campaign technologies, principally in the advent of media (read television advertising, usually broadcast), revolutionized the exposure of political campaigns to voters, candidates themselves and interest groups. But the focus of much of the literature was on the former category of the electorate. Medvic (1997) relates that scholars deferred attention to the general role of political consultants in favor of lavish theoretical attention devoted to the incumbency advantage and money (1997: 14-15). His study points out how changes in the campaign environment, especially a media-centric focus on the individual candidate, led to a growing role of political consultants at least in congressional campaigns. And, while the influence of consultants became more pervasive, scholarly attention did not necessarily follow.

The advent of advanced voter-targeting methods revolutionized the universe of campaigns.¹³ This change, however, ignores the goal of political campaigns which has largely remained the same throughout history: development, definition, and delivery of a campaign message to voters. Nimmo (1970) simply refers to these advances as, “a series of communications in specific settings between campaigners and constituents” (1970: 163). And while this is not a fundamental change in technique, the identification of supporters and message for initiative campaigns is distinct through each stage of the campaign process. So, the larger question becomes, if new technologies changed elections but the goals of campaigns were based on the long-held principles, what if anything changed with the new industry of political professionals?

While growth in the technological requirements of campaigns is a reflection of the desire by candidates to communicate with voters, there was an ancillary effect with the campaign environment. As the profession of consultants was perceived to be more successful, candidates used different types of professionals in distinct ways. In candidate elections, this would include more specialists for fundraising, direct mail and media advertising (Herrnson 1996). The level of the race, campaigns for the U.S. House as opposed to the U.S. Senate, also plays some role in the level of professional assistance (Medvic 1998). However, certain professionals and firms carry over from one election to the next working for a distinct group of candidates (and hence, a distinct party). Candidates seek high - profile, established consultants in order to lessen the uncertainty of their own election (and re-election) while also signaling to potential donors and challengers the seriousness of their candidacy. Therefore, as the consulting

¹³ These advanced techniques include polling, fundraising, and television advertising among other specialties. See Shea (1996) for more information.

establishment grows, its “permanence” reflects established business relationships, partisan linkages, strategic behavior by both candidates and political professionals themselves as well as attempts to pick up as much year-round, non-seasonal business as possible. Quickly, though, the market reaches a saturation point especially as incumbents reach almost certain levels of re-election. As the rate of incumbency re-election rises, business is retained with some of these officeholders, but political professionals are challenged to find the optimum conditions of well-funded open seat or well-funded challenger campaigns. The market for their newly perfected and specialized tools quickly reaches a saturation point. Therefore, I argue, political professionals turn to direct democracy elections where the stakes are higher in terms of spending and entry costs are easier because of the ability to sell wares to players now engaged in ballot measure campaigns. These campaigns require an expertise in navigating the regulatory shoals unique to each stage of the initiative game. For example, as Proposition 9 (1974) altered reporting requirements for all campaigns, the unique requirement of reporting compliance emerged where ballot measure campaigns employed the talents of political attorneys not only to draft initiative language, but also to ensure compliance with the newly enacted Political Reform Act. In the next section, I discuss how changes resulting from Proposition 13 were consequential for political professionals and the initiative process.

1.42 Theoretical Component #2: Changes With the Process of Initiative Campaigns - The “Big Bang” Legacy of Proposition 13

The passage of Proposition 13 by California voters in 1978 was a political watershed in many ways. Scholars have usually focused on the wave of anti-tax measures that Proposition 13 ushered in around the country shortly thereafter. But while Proposition 13 guided a subsequent national tax revolt, its passage was an eye -opener for political professionals. The possibilities that Proposition 13 afforded potential initiative players was enormous. Smith (1999) points out how, “The catalyst for the nationwide surge of citizen initiatives was unquestionably California’s 1978 property tax cutting measure, Proposition 13” (1999: 3). Two prominent political scientists of direct democracy echoed this sentiment. Cronin (1989) observed how Proposition 13, “triggered similar tax-slashing measures (both as bills and as direct legislation by the people) in numerous other states” (1989: 1-2). Magleby (1984) noted that Proposition 13 set the tone for national politics into the decade following its passage.

Smith (1999) points out how the campaign for Proposition 13 was clearly a professional, well - funded affair. Despite populist sounding rhetoric, the principal proponent leader, Howard Jarvis, was able to raise through two organizations, the United Organization of Taxpayers (UOT) and the Los Angeles Apartment Owners Association (LAAOA), hundreds of thousands of dollars for the petition gathering and campaign stages of the process (1999: 78-82). This money went to professionally gather signatures in order to prop up current popular signature collection efforts and for computerized direct mail campaign services. This expansive direct mail effort begun by several firms was heightened by the efforts of Below, Tobe and Associates and later the firm of Butcher - Forde (Smith 1999: 77; See also Magleby 1984). According to Smith, the Jarvis proponent campaign spent \$2,152,874 of the \$2,279,567 raised. Opponents spent \$2,000,204 of the \$2,120,931 raised (Ibid.).

Magleby (1984) focused on the critical role of direct mail specialists and general consultants, Bill Butcher and Arnold Forde, in the Proposition 13 campaign. Arguing that their role was critical in keeping the operation afloat and before voters through repeated direct mail petition and fundraising solicitations, Magleby maintains that the firm carried the disheveled and misdirected proponent forces forward. What seems clear, however, is the view that political professionals could have access to large amounts of cash to use in ways they saw fit, while having the luxury of exploring larger markets with only a limited downside. Their learning was quick and complete as the findings illustrate in this essay.

Passage of Proposition 13 highlights an important facet of California's direct democracy experience: organized, passionate players in ballot measure campaigns need assistance to be successful. Because initiative campaigns are the domain of interest groups, experienced political professionals are needed to guide the players during the stages of the process. Candidate campaign consultants provide this experience. As new players enter the arena, the forest of structural and behavioral obstacles can appear overwhelming. From drafting Title and Summary to collecting up to 1 million signatures, proponents need guidance to even have a chance to get on the ballot (Shultz 1996). Opponents have equally daunting challenges as they seek to develop a campaign strategy, analyze the potential legislation, and enforce a coalition to provide both monetary and non - monetary support. Political professionals expand their services from the candidate campaign arena to the initiative arena to lead each group to their desired goal.

Proposition 13 was a “big - bang” for the growth of political professionals. The possibilities for direct democracy became clear as exposure to the campaign increased. Magleby (1984) recognized this, asserting that, “Not only did the California tax-cutting vote overshadow the candidate races and other propositions of the 1978 primary election season, but its importance also grew as it received national attention” (1984: 6). A growing population of candidate consultants squeezing the existing market together with the potential of newly engaged interest groups using the initiative process for policy aims, caught the attention of political professionals. As the population of political professionals grew past the current, identifiable market (the market of candidate campaigns), these professionals sought new avenues for their services. Initiative players with access to campaign cash and an energized membership base through statewide associations were the logical target. And since these players were new to a game designed for amateurs but clearly requiring support to succeed, political professionals filled a new market need. They could do this by selling an expertise in the campaign tools necessary for candidate campaigns.

1.43 Theoretical Component #3: ‘Spillover’ From Candidate Campaigns to the Arena of Direct Democracy

The components of my argument noted above boil down to a straightforward proposition: Political professionals expanded their wares in candidate campaigns through the growth of overall campaign activity from the 1960s through the 1970s. As the initiative arena experience the policy activism prominent during this period and after the “big bang” potential witnessed by Proposition 13, political professionals were in the right place at the right time and with the right resource allocation for all initiative players. This argument enriches the literature on candidate campaign professionals while also explaining why most initiative players use political professionals with almost guaranteed certainty today. This new professionalism reflects the rise of “permanent initiative campaigns” and the realization by all players in the initiative process that some type or level of political professionalization is needed to ensure success.

The spillover of candidate campaign consultants to ballot measure campaigns occurred as the market became saturated. Political professionals sought new markets for their wares to ensure survival and expansion. Since new technologies altered the candidate campaign environment, there is every expectation that a similar phenomena

occurred with direct democracy. And the arena of ballot measure campaigns is unique to foster this change.

Applying the rationale for new electioneering technologies altering the candidate campaign environment to initiative campaigns is a helpful exercise. Direct democracy campaigns offer a unique regulatory environment that challenges the conventional wisdom of political scientists. The belief that all groups will use political professionals with equal purpose and regularity (a corollary of the "effects" theory among the candidate campaign literature) neglects the differences through each stage of the process. Some groups may have money for only drafting or collecting signatures. Others may be able to fund a campaign through each stage. Nonetheless, as groups navigate through the hurdles of direct democracy, successful completion through each stage poses unique requirements. The hurdles of issue development, qualification of the measure, onto the campaign stage are similar to candidate campaigns but sufficiently unique to warrant a separate focus. These stages of the process provide a framework for understanding how professionals might carry over their services from one electoral arena to another. One way this may occur is if professionals seek new markets and their potential customers are receptive to the goods offered. The candidate campaign literature is helpful in this regard.

Sabato (1981) points to the general rise of political consulting as a necessary condition for successful political campaigns. This recognition together with "the heightened media attention given to the increased importance of consultants in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (Thurber 1998: 146) influences the early, critical stages of campaigns where the level of professionalization may impact the ultimate success of a ballot measure. We might think of this applying to ballot measure campaigns through the players who perceive that consultants are "necessary" for success. Growth of the industry (or the supply of political professionals) may push demand for assistance as professionals seek new avenues for their services. If their services appear necessary for success, then all the better for professionals as they seek out new markets.

Since initiative elections provide a unique set of measurement circumstances, changes in that environment - either in the size of the industry or with the timing of professional assistance - is critical. The stages of drafting ballot language and qualification lengthen as groups test and solicit possible initiative measures. Similarly, in the candidate campaign arena, candidates construct well-defined lists of supporters and mine these lists for campaign contributions and organizational support. In both arenas - direct democracy and candidate campaigns - year-round, non-seasonal companies result

that are staffed by a cadre of consulting generalists and specialists. Past campaign experience leads proponents (or political candidates & interest groups) and opponents to develop an organization of political professionals based on fields of specialization to promote a ballot issue or campaign message. This environment accelerates in the period immediately after 1978, when a highly salient ballot measure campaign to reduce property taxes, Proposition 13, demonstrates the possibilities for year-round, full-time initiative operations. This "permanent initiative campaign" serves the interests of both the professional political industry and groups interested in pursuing or opposing ballot measures, regardless of the group's level of political sophistication and resources.

While the "permanent initiative campaign" serves the interests of both political professionals and interest groups, in order to answer the question of why political professionals increased specifically in the arena of direct democracy, I look to the work of scholars in economics. While largely discredited as an indicator of wage - fund theory, Say's Law, or the concept of demand rising to meet supply, has some merit when it comes to initiative politics. This long accepted doctrine of demand rising to meet supply was based on a freedom of exchange within an economy (Hansen 1953). This exchange model is conceived as the flow of income (or in the present case, demand for assistance of some kind in an initiative campaign) generated from the process of production itself. That is, success and the use of professionals in previous campaigns, say, from the candidate campaign area, and the call for their services enlarges based not on demand but on the supply of existing resources. The employment of previously unused resources "pays its own way since it enlarges the income stream by an amount equivalent to the amount taken out of the income stream through the sale of its products" (Hansen 1953: 3). This new process of production pays out income to employed forces, generating demand at the same time that it adds to supply. Since the market is not fixed or limited and capable of expansion, the market becomes as large as the range of products offered. In our case, the supply of professionals encouraged by their perceived success, breeds further demand for their services as campaigns become technologically advanced.

We might think of the rise of political professionals because we had more types of campaigns using the tools of modern electioneering. With more campaigns, came more business opportunities as supply increased and created its own demand. The candidate campaign market was saturated. As these professionals carried over to direct democracy, perceptions changed about their role. This perception was assisted by the dramatic success of Proposition 13. As more professionals are involved with perceived "winners" -

be they proponents or opponents - opportunities for an enhanced role in direct democracy results. Magleby (1984) provides some support for this view when he cites the role of the political consulting firm of Butcher - Forde in the successful direct mail signature solicitation and fund-raising effort used for Proposition 13 in 1978. By 1980, the firm's success blossomed and Butcher - Forde was conducting fundraising for state Senator John Briggs a candidate for Governor, working with the Jarvis organization on an income tax initiative, and a Briggs-sponsored death penalty measure. Butcher - Forde was also working for Republicans in the state Legislature.¹⁴

Critics of Say's law argued that the pricing system and the limits of effective demand were not realized into production. One critic, J. M Clark, pointed to the shortcomings of Say's law in the United States and attacked the logic of supply creating its own demand. Clark (1934) pointed out that "there exists a very considerable margin of unused capacity owing to the condition commonly thought of and spoken of as limited effective demand" (1934: 106). The lack of assimilated power into an economy works so that the demand for consumer goods generally does not increase as fast as production power (Hansen: 9). For initiatives and the universe of political professionals, the probability of a successful campaign may fuel demand for services, but at a rate dependent on the level of overall business activity. Say's law, therefore, provides us with some theoretical leverage to base the growth of political professionals on something other than mere invention. But it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this principle in light of our knowledge of how candidate consulting carried over to initiative campaigns. It is through this understanding that I develop a research hypothesis that joins the campaign literature with Magleby's (1984) findings:

H1: If ballot measure activity grew over the last 20 years, then the role of political professionals increased.

1.5 Conclusion: Obscuring the Trees from the Forest - Data on California Initiatives

Aggregating the data on initiative activity masks the richness of the state's initiative experience. What is clear from illustrations of the history of the California initiative experience is the immediate success of those measures that were proposed and actually qualified. The first years of California's direct democracy experience were marked by

¹⁴ Butcher - Forde worked to collect signatures on past Briggs initiatives, including Proposition 24 in 1978. For additional information, see also Smith 1999; Berg & Holman 1985; and Fitzgerald 23

great success for interests proposing ballot measures. Moreover, the traditional view advanced by scholars is that this early period is characterized as the triumph of citizen-based political amateurs over the interests of a state legislature victim to any myriad number of special interests. In fact, this myth about the amateurism of direct democracy dies hard. A more accurate view includes acknowledgment of political professionals involved in this process from its inception in 1912.¹⁵ Few observers, on seeing the ranks of early professionals - paid signature gathering crews, printers and artists, and other general consultants - would conclude that the presence of campaign professionals is neither new to the post World War II era nor unique to direct democracy.

Despite this condition, these arguments are revisited time and again in the literature on direct democracy and elections. Not only have professionals been allied with interests doing battle on the initiative front almost from the very beginning, but also the subject matter of initiatives has been relatively consistent. Moreover, the early years witnessed higher rates of qualification and passage when compared with more recent eras when political professionals and interest group initiative wars were believed to have taken over the process. So, the early years, while more successful overall for getting measures to the ballot, do not appear to be anomalous in terms of the level of professionalization or the general success of the subject matter of initiatives.

In one seminal work, Magleby (1984) takes to task the rise of a powerful initiative industry and its role in shaping electoral outcomes. Coming on the heels of success with Proposition 13, Magleby attributes much of the success for the measure to the central role played by such political professionals as Butcher – Forde. Moreover, while noting the underlying issue saliency of property tax relief, Magleby adds that the critical tools and expertise of campaign consultants played an important role in success this time around. Smith (1999) continues in this vein with the view that despite reports to the contrary, the Jarvis / Gann operation was well – funded and took full advantage of the latest electioneering tools. Therefore, the lineage of success for interest groups is rooted in the very roots of direct democracy. Indeed, the success rate for qualification and movement through all 3 stages of the initiative process is better in the early years when presumably political professionals and their wares were not as highly developed (nor as expensive!) as today. So, what changed? Groups are involved today just like their cousins of the past. Moreover, the wares of consulting are more numerous and the potential mates for these tools are more plentiful, too. Most groups today use political professionals in each

1980.

¹⁵ In previous work (McCuan, et al. 1998), I describe the long involvement of political professionals

stage and can choose from a wider array of potential service mixes. That is, while the firm of Whitaker and Baxter together with Joe Robinson could be retained in 1940, today's groups meet with pollsters, generalists, political attorneys, and media specialists in many cases *before* they even meet with a petition circulation firm. This is even more often the case if a group lost a battle before or can draw from similar campaign experience. The 'amateurs,' if that term can be used with any applicability, now use professional assistance as well. None of this is new as Magleby (1984; 1998) and Smith (1999) pointed out. However, professional services dominate the process from early on (and earlier on still) while moving costs forward and have only mixed results at best. And, initiative campaigns, like voters, are now consumers of the tools of political professionals. Subsequent study should point us in the direction of analyzing the effects of actors (and their campaigns) as consumers of political professionals' wares.

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**Eras of Political Professionalization in California
1912-1998**

**California Initiative Data
1912-1998**

Era of Political Consulting/Professionals:	# Submitted:	# Qualified:	# Passed:	% Submit/Qualified:	% Qual/Passed:	% Passed Overall:
Early Consulting Era: (1912 - 1929)	97	65	18	67.0	27.7	18.6
Childhood of Consulting: (1930 - 1959)	126	69	18	54.8	26.1	14.3
Wild, Wild Adolescence: (1960 - 1979)	227	34	10	15.0	29.4	4.4
Coming of Age: (1980 - 1998)	593	104	41	17.5	39.4	6.9
Totals/Average: (1912 - 1998)	1043	272	87	26.1	32	8.3


**Initiative Numbers
1912-1998**

ELECTION	PROPOSED	QUALIFIED	PASSED	% PROP to QUAL	% QUAL to PASS	% PROP to PASS
1912	5	4	1	80.00	25.00	20.00
1913	5	4	2	80.00	50.00	40.00
1914	21	12	3	57.14	25.00	14.29
1915	2	2	0	100.00	0.00	0.00
1916	3	2	1	66.67	50.00	33.33
1917	1	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00
1918	7	5	1	71.43	20.00	14.29
1919	2	1	0	50.00	0.00	0.00
1920	14	9	3	64.29	33.33	21.43
1921	6	6	3	100.00	50.00	50.00
1922	10	5	1	50.00	20.00	10.00
1924	7	5	2	71.43	40.00	28.57
1925	2	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
1926	9	7	1	77.78	14.29	11.11
1928	3	2	0	66.67	0.00	0.00
1930	6	5	1	83.33	20.00	16.67
1932	8	6	2	75.00	33.33	25.00
1933	1	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
1934	23	11	6	47.83	54.55	26.09
1935	1	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00
1936	12	6	0	50.00	0.00	0.00
1938	16	8	1	50.00	12.50	6.25
1939	1	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00
1940	8	1	0	12.50	0.00	0.00
1942	4	2	0	50.00	0.00	0.00
1944	4	3	1	75.00	33.33	25.00
1946	12	3	1	25.00	33.33	8.33
1948	12	9	3	75.00	33.33	25.00
1949	2	2	2	100.00	100.00	100.00
1950	5	4	0	80.00	0.00	0.00
1952	3	2	1	66.67	50.00	33.33
1954	2	1	0	50.00	0.00	0.00

ELECTION	PROPOSED	QUALIFIED	PASSED	% PROP to QUAL	% QUAL to PASS	% PROP to PASS
1956	2	1	0	50.00	0.00	0.00
1957	1	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00
1958	3	2	0	66.67	0.00	0.00
1960	3	1	0	33.33	0.00	0.00
1961	1	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
1962	6	2	0	33.33	0.00	0.00
1963	2	2	1	100.00	50.00	50.00
1964	6	2	2	33.33	100.00	33.33
1965	3	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
1966	7	1	0	14.29	0.00	0.00
1967	4	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
1968	6	1	0	16.67	0.00	0.00
1969	9	1	0	11.11	0.00	0.00
1970	7	1	0	14.29	0.00	0.00
1971	7	1	0	14.29	0.00	0.00
1972	15	8	3	53.33	37.50	20.00
1973	7	2	1	28.57	50.00	14.29
1974	33	2	0	6.06	0.00	0.00
1975	10	1	0	10.00	0.00	0.00
1976	24	1	0	4.17	0.00	0.00
1977	16	4	2	25.00	50.00	12.50
1978	20	1	1	5.00	100.00	5.00
1979	41	3	0	7.32	0.00	0.00
1980	29	3	2	10.34	66.67	6.90
1981	30	5	3	16.67	60.00	10.00
1982	19	2	0	10.53	0.00	0.00
1983	29	6	2	20.69	33.33	6.90
1984	16	3	1	18.75	33.33	6.25
1985	18	4	2	22.22	50.00	11.11
1986	15	3	3	20.00	100.00	20.00
1987	42	12	6	28.57	50.00	14.29
1988	27	5	2	18.52	40.00	7.41
1989	36	11	4	30.56	36.36	11.11
1990	36	7	2	19.44	28.57	5.56

ELECTION	PROPOSED	QUALIFIED	PASSED	% PROP to QUAL	% QUAL to PASS	% PROP to PASS
1991	29	4	2	13.79	50.00	6.90
1992	30	4	1	13.33	25.00	3.33
1993	30	2	1	6.67	50.00	3.33
1994	35	6	2	17.14	33.33	5.71
1995	40	10	5	25.00	50.00	12.50
1996	45	7	1	15.56	14.29	2.22
1998	87	10	2	11.49	20.00	2.30

Figure 1.1
Chart of Initiative Activity
1912-1998



**Figure 1.2
Policy Areas of California Initiatives
1912-1996**

Subject	Initiatives 1912-1996	% of All Initiatives	Cumulative %
Governmental & Political Processes	55	21%	21%
Revenue, Taxation & Bonds	49	19%	40%
Business & Labor Regulations	43	16%	56%
Health, Welfare, & Housing	36	14%	70%
Public Morality	33	13%	82%
Environment & Land Use	16	6%	89%
Civil Liberties & Civil Rights	14	5%	94%
Education	7	3%	97%
Total: Subject by Category, 1912-1996	253		

Subject	Initiatives 1960-1996	% of All Initiatives	Cumulative %
Governmental & Political Processes	28	22%	22%
Revenue, Taxation & Bonds	24	19%	41%
Business & Labor Regulations	21	16%	57%
Health, Welfare, & Housing	14	11%	68%
Public Morality	7	5%	73%
Environment & Land Use	15	12%	85%
Civil Liberties & Civil Rights	12	9%	95%
Education	3	2%	97%
Total on Ballot, 1960-1996	128		
Total on Ballot, 1912-1996	262		
Total on Ballot, 1912-1998	272		

Note: Compiled from Jones 1996; 1998 and the California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992.

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